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A “NARROW EXCEPTION” RUN AMOK: HOW COURTS
HAVE MISCONSTRUED EMPLOYEE-RIGHTS LAWS’
EXCLUSION OF “POLICYMAKING” APPOINTEES, AND
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR GETTING BACK ON
TRACK
Angela Galloway
Abstract: The civil rights and workplace protections afforded some government workers
vary vastly nationwide because federal circuit courts disagree over how to interpret an
exemption common to five landmark employment statutes. Each statute defines “employee”
for its purposes to exclude politicians and certain categories of politicians’ appointees—
including government employees appointed by elected officials to serve at “the policymaking
level.” Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court has defined who belongs to
the “policymaking-level” class. Consequently, lower federal courts across the country have
adopted their own standards to fill the gap, creating a wide circuit split. At stake in this
employment law vagary are basic worker rights guaranteed by major federal statutes. The
U.S. Supreme Court or Congress should articulate a lucid definition for the exception for
appointees on the “policymaking level” that honors Congress’s intent for a narrow exception:
the exemption should apply only to positions characterized by both a direct working
relationship with the appointer and an explicit duty to make substantive policy.

INTRODUCTION
Consider the professionals that elected officials appoint to serve them
at the “policymaking level” of American government. Agency directors
likely spring to mind. Perhaps also executive cabinet members. But do
probation officers1 or health inspectors?2 Would you include part-time
assessors3 or sheriffs’ deputies?4 Some federal judges do deem such
employees as serving at the “policymaking level”—a status that can cost
workers some of their basic civil rights protections.
Meanwhile, other federal courts take a contrary approach—declining
to label as policymakers,5 for instance, the director of a senior services
1. O’Reilly v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 102CV1242-DFH, 2003 WL 23101795, at *10 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 24, 2003).
2. Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993).
3. Beckmann v. Darden, 351 F. Supp. 2d 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
4. Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1993); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209,
1218 (7th Cir. 1991). In both cases, probationary deputies asserted they had been fired in improper
acts of political patronage.
5. In each case, that determination was ultimately left to a jury; the judges in each rejected
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agency,6 a police commander,7 the head of a juvenile detention training
center,8 and—again—sheriffs’ deputies.9
The difference: geography. Whether courts deem politicians’
appointees10 as “policymaking-level” workers—and thus beyond the
reach of workers’ rights statutes—depends on where the workers live.
The civil rights and workplace protections afforded some government
workers vary vastly nationwide because federal circuit courts disagree
over how to interpret an exemption shared by five landmark employment
statutes. Congress excluded elected officials and their top advisers from
the laws protecting employees against discrimination11 and substandard
employment conditions.12 Each statute defines “employee” for its
purposes13 to exclude politicians and certain categories of politicians’
appointees who are not protected by civil service laws.14 The exempted
categories—virtually identical among the statutes—include government
employees who are appointed by elected officials to serve at “the

defendants’ claims that the plaintiffs were excluded as a matter of law under an exemption for
“policymaking level” appointees.
6. Jones-Walsh v. Town of Cicero, No. 04 C 6029, 2005 WL 2293671, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,
2005).
7. Gomez-Mesquita v. City of Detroit, No. 06-12844, 2007 WL 2225859, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
2, 2007).
8. Collins v. Cook Cnty., No. 06 CV 6651, 2008 WL 4925009, at *5 (N.D. Ill Nov. 14, 2008).
9. Morgan v. Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, Civil Action No. 77-3814, 1979 WL 108, at *2 (E.D.
La. Mar. 28, 1979); Howard v. Ward Cnty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 502 (D.N.D. 1976).
10. The author has chosen the term “politicians’ appointees” over the more commonly used
phrase “political appointees” because the latter implies a broader and potentially off-mark status,
i.e., employees appointed by a political process. By contrast, the statutory term at issue here refers
to only employees appointed directly by elected officials.
11. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
13. The exceptions are codified as follows: 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f); 29
U.S.C. § 2611(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of the FLSA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) reads, in part: “The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an
employer, except that the term ‘employee’ shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State . . . or any person chosen by such officer to be on such
officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.”
14. State civil service laws govern terms and conditions of public employment. They include
standards for appointment and termination; they are intended to foster merit-based decisions and
prevent politically-motivated public employment actions. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Civil Service § 1.
(“[T]he historical and fundamental purpose of the civil service and its merit system principles is to
insulate a state work force from political influence so as to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of the state government.”).
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policymaking level.”15 Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme
Court has defined who belongs to that “policymaking” class.16 The result
is a statutory definition of “employee” so convoluted one federal judge
described it as “an outstanding example of bad draftsmanship.”17
Consequently, lower federal courts across the country have adopted their
own standards to fill the gap, creating a wide circuit split.18 In 2010, the
Seventh Circuit expressly declined to bridge the gap, deciding instead
that the exception denied discrimination protections to all nine hundred19
of Illinois’s assistant state’s attorneys.20
Dozens of cases illustrate the inconsistent application of the
“policymaking” exception. For example, one federal judge in New
Mexico dismissed a former town administrator’s age discrimination
claim after deeming the position as on “policymaking level,” in part
because the administrator could recommend policies to superiors.21 But
an Iowa judge came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts, finding
that a county agency director did not qualify for the exception because
he could only recommend policies, while his superiors retained the final
15. In each statute, the exception is defined as being on “the” or “a” “policymaking level,” never
as “policymaker.” In fact, the First Circuit Court of Appeals said that distinction is consequential in
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1988). The point of the distinction is well taken.
However, for the sake of simplicity, this Comment will at times use abbreviated references to the
exception, for example, “policymaker exception.”
16. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that Missouri’s appointed state judges
are at the policymaking level for purposes of discrimination statutes, and in doing so suggested that
state judges are thus broadly excluded. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991). In Gregory,
the U.S. Supreme Court did not endorse a general standard for evaluating whether an employee
serves on “policymaking level.” Id. Instead, it ruled narrowly on the question of whether the statute,
i.e., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), applied to judges: “We will not read the
ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included . . . In the
context of a statute that plainly excludes most important state public officials, ‘appointee on the
policymaking level’ is sufficiently broad that we cannot conclude that the statute plainly covers
appointed state judges. Therefore, it does not.” Id. (emphasis in original).
17. Howard v. Ward Cnty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 502 (D.N.D. 1976).
18. Compare Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
__ S.Ct. __, 2011 WL 4530126 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (No. 10-1163), with Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t
of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 2000).
19. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Leonard Cahnmann at 13, Opp, 630 F.3d 616 (No. 10-1060),
2010 WL 1062296.
20. Opp, 630 F.3d at 621–22. In Opp, the Seventh Circuit dismissed appeals by three plaintiffs.
Id. at 622. The Circuit had previously consolidated the cases brought by two of the plaintiffs, Opp
and Barrett. Brief of Defendant-Appellees, Opp, 630 F.3d 616 (Nos. 09-3714, 09-3923), 2010 WL
3950610, at *6. The Circuit declined to consolidate the claim by the third party, Cahnmann, but
decided his appeal the same day. Id.
21. Terry v. Town of Red River, Civ. No. 90-206 SC, 1995 WL 442099, at *4 (D.N.M. Aug. 8,
1991) (finding town administrator served on the policymaking level because he enjoyed discretion
and could recommended policy).
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say.22 Another judge barred a discrimination claim by a deputy elections
supervisor because he held authority to “arrest, subpoena and investigate
possible violations of elections laws,” which the judge interpreted as
policymaking-level duties.23 But another judge allowed a former sheriff
deputy’s suit, explaining that the policymaking exemption was “aimed at
persons such as members of a governor’s cabinet.”24 And a judge in
Indiana said a probation officer qualified as a policymaker because her
decisions “may promote or undermine the policies” of others.25 But a
federal judge in Texas allowed a suit by a former city manager, finding
she was not exempted because she did not actually make policy—she
merely implemented it.26
At stake in this employment law vagary are basic worker rights
guaranteed by federal statutes. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
bars discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.27 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits
age discrimination against workers who are at least forty years old.28 The
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides minimum wage and overtime
pay protections.29 The Equal Pay Act (EPA) mandates equal pay
between the sexes for comparable work.30 And the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) requires larger employers to provide unpaid leave to
employees with serious health conditions or family caretaking
obligations.31 According to the shared definition of “employee,” each of
22. Brown v. Poke Cnty., 811 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
23. Russo v. Ryerson, No. 01-CV-4458 JLL, 2006 WL 477006, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2006). In
the unpublished opinion, the court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that his duties were “more
administrative than discretionary,” with Russo noting that he “did not speak on behalf of a
policymaker and made no significant changes to the election supervision system.” Id. Still, the court
held that the plaintiff enjoyed sufficient discretion to qualify for the policymaking exception: “[A]
position which possesses the authority to arrest, subpoena and investigate possible violations of
elections laws necessarily involves policy considerations. Although Russo . . . did not have the
discretion not to enforce the elections laws, [he] possessed broad discretion regarding how to
structure and execute investigations into possible violations. These exercises of discretion constitute
policymaking.” Id.
24. Howard v. Ward Cnty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 502 (D.N.D. 1976); see also Morgan v. Sheriff of
Tangipahoa Parish, Civil Action No. 77-3814, 1979 WL 108, at *2 (D. La. Mar. 28, 1979).
25. O’Reilly v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 102CV1242-DFH, 2003 WL 23101795, at *10 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 24, 2003).
26. Gomez v. City of Eagle Pass, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004–05 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006).
29. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201–219, 203(e)(2)(C)(ii)(III) (2006 & Supp.
III 2009), amended by Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
30. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
31. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611(3) (2006), incorporating by
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these statutes denies protection to workers appointed at the
“policymaking level”—making interpretation of that term critical to
determining public employees’ rights.
The unresolved scope of the “policymaking-level” exemption results
in judicial discord over who is protected by the laws against
discrimination and shoddy work conditions.32 At one end of the
spectrum, the Seventh Circuit reads the phrase broadly: the exception
denies protection to employees who so much as implement policies, or
offer suggestions about them.33 Several other circuits embrace a much
narrower approach, holding that the exception applies only to top
appointees “closely associated” with the elected officials who appointed
them.34
This Comment asserts the need for a single, lucid definition of the
“policymaking-level” exception, and endorses an approach based on
statutory language, legislative history and policy objectives. Part I
introduces the laws at issue and the development of the exception for
appointees at the “policymaking level.” Part II examines the split
between: (1) the Seventh Circuit’s long-standing but unique approach;
and (2) the narrower standard most thoroughly developed by the Second
Circuit and generally accepted by several other circuits. Part III argues
that both approaches miss the mark, and advocates instead for a more
precise three-part analysis that better reflects congressional intent: the
“policymaking-level” exception should apply only to professionals who
work directly with their appointers and who establish official policy of a
substantive nature.

reference the exemptions identified in the FLSA at 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2006).
32. Congress has enacted a separate remedy under the Government Employees Rights Act
(GERA) for some appointees asserting employment discrimination, including Title VII and ADEA
claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)–(c) (2006), amended by the Congressional Accountability Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (Jan. 23, 1995); see also 1 Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Federal
Law § 13:6. GERA requires aggrieved workers seek administrative relief from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 808
n.4 (10th Cir. 2008). Only once that review is complete might workers get access to court by
appealing an adverse EEOC decision to the United States Court of Appeals. Id. Once the EEOC has
made a determination, de novo review is not available. Guy v. Illinois, 958 F. Supp. 1300, 1306
(N.D. Ill. 1997). Also, if the EEOC finds for the worker, unlike under Title VII, the worker is “not
entitled to recover punitive damages under GERA.” Dyer v. Radcliffe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775
(S.D. Ohio 2001).
33. See, e.g., Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that “Warzon’s
complaint and attachments are replete with information showing that she had significant input and
authority over” government policies).
34. This approach is most fully developed by the Second Circuit. See infra Part II.C.
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CONGRESS INTENDED TO CATALYZE SWEEPING SOCIAL
CHANGE THROUGH THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE-RIGHTS
STATUTES

The statutes35 subject to this interpretive inconsistency share two
major policy goals: to shield workers from discrimination based on their
membership in a protected class, and to protect employees from legally
unacceptable pay and workplace conditions.36 They stem from
Congress’s aspiration to catalyze fundamental social change.37
A.

The Statutes at Stake Protect Employees from Poor Work
Conditions and Discrimination Based on Race, Religion, Age, and
Caregiver Status

The oldest of the statutes at issue is the FLSA, which established a
national minimum wage, overtime pay protections, and child labor
standards, with some significant categorical exceptions.38 The goal was
to protect workers from “oppressive” work conditions and “substandard”
wages.39 In 1963, Congress broadened the FLSA through the EPA,
which bars sex-based wage disparities.40
The most comprehensive of the anti-discrimination statutes at issue is
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,41 which bars certain forms of
discrimination42 and aims to foster racial integration.43 The Act is best
35. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634
(2006); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§2601–2654 (2006); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
36. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
37. See infra Part I.A.
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
39. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739 (“The principal congressional purpose in enacting the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 was to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive
working hours, ‘labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a)).
40. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)).
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000a–2000h (“[T]o enforce the constitutional right to
vote . . . to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations . . . to protect
constitutional rights in public facilities and public education . . . to prevent discrimination in
federally assisted programs [and employment] . . . and for other purposes.”).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246
(1964) (“The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through
peaceful and voluntary settlement discrimination in voting, as well as in places of accommodation
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known for its provisions mandating school desegregation and
prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public accommodation.44
Additionally, Title VII of the Act bars most employers45 from
employment discrimination against protected classes.46 The U.S.
Supreme Court has described the Act’s broad remedial purpose as: “to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees.”47 At the time of the Act’s passage,
Congress considered fairness in employment an integral element to the
success of its overall civil rights goals.48 Over the decades, Congress has
broadened the law’s scope49 and courts have liberally construed the
Act.50 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has read it to include a
prohibition against unintentional discrimination through policies that
have a “disparate impact” on protected classes.51
In 1967, Congress added the ADEA to the civil rights arsenal, barring

and public facilities, federally secured programs and in employment.”).
43. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), c to c-9 (2006).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). The statute defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person” excluding the United States government, Indian tribes, any department or agency of the
District of Columbia, and “a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization).”
Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). The statute bars discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Id.
47. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
48. The U.S. Supreme Court has said: “Congress’s primary concern in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with ‘the plight of the
Negro in our economy.’” Weber, 443 U.S. at 202–03 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). The Weber Court noted that during Congressional debate, Sen.
Humphrey highlighted statistical trends showing that the disparity between nonwhite unemployment
and white unemployment had nearly doubled from 1947 to 1962. “Congress feared that the goals of
the Civil Rights Act—the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society—could not
be achieved unless this trend was reversed . . . . [I]t was clear to Congress that ‘[t]he crux of the
problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been
traditionally closed to them. . . . [I]t was to this problem that Title VII’s prohibition against racial
discrimination in employment was primarily addressed.” Id.
49. See infra Part I.B.
50. Courts generally read Title VII liberally in order to support its policy objectives. Nancy E.
Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75,
75 n.4 (1984) (citing Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Rowe v. Gen.
Motors Corp. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972)).
51. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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some workplace discrimination based on relatively old age.52 Congress
intended the ADEA to “promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”53 As with
Title VII, Congress hoped that the ADEA would foster social change.54
Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 largely to address a specific area
of workplace sex discrimination: bias against women workers based on
their status as family caregivers.55 Congress found that “family
caretaking often falls on women,” affecting their working lives more
than that of men and creating “serious potential” for discrimination.56
The FMLA requires covered employers to provide eligible workers up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year to care for a new baby or a
relative with a “serious health” condition.57 The FMLA applies to those
employed by businesses with staffs of fifty or more workers.58
Each statute initially exempted from its protections a substantial work
force: government employees. Congress incrementally expanded each
statute to cover many public employees—but each time carved out a
number of exceptions, including the exclusion for political appointees on
the policymaking level.59

52. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006)). The U.S. Supreme Court has said, “[T]he ADEA was
concerned to protect a relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage of the
relatively young.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590–91 (2004). Also,
“[T]he ADEA, among other things, makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.’”
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
The ADEA applies to workers at least forty years old and recognizes defenses including “age as a
bona fide occupational qualification, differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age,
discharge or other personnel action for good cause, and observation of the terms of a bona fide
seniority or employee benefit plan.” 75 AM. JUR. Trials § 363 (2000).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
54. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (“Congress designed
the remedial measures in these statutes to serve as a ‘spur or catalyst’ to cause employers ‘to selfexamine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges’ of discrimination.” (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 417–18 (1975)).
55. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006)).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5)–(6).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A), (C).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
59. See infra Part I.B.
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Congress Later Expanded Several of the Worker Protection
Statutes to Include Government Workers—with Narrow Exceptions

Title VII suffered a rocky start and weak enforcement due in large
part to Congress’s decisions to limit the enforcement powers of the
EEOC60 and to exclude public workers from the Civil Rights Act’s
protection.61 Civil rights advocates persistently demanded that Congress
expand that Act, complaining that the law failed to protect employees of
schools as well as local, state, and federal governments despite
widespread acknowledgement of discrimination by such employers.62 In
1972, Congress addressed those issues by amending Title VII,
substantially bolstering the EEOC’s authority and expanding the statute
to protect state and local government employees.63 This change
immediately brought more than ten million additional workers within the
statute’s ambit.64
Still, lawmakers excluded several categories of public workers from
coverage, including the category of workers appointed at the
policymaking level. The “very narrow” exceptions originally proposed
by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina65 deny coverage to government
employees, except those protected by state civil service laws. The
exemptions apply to (1) elected officials and (2) staffers appointed by an
elected official to serve on the official’s personal staff, on a
“policymaking level” or as “an immediate adviser.”66 When the
Congressional conference committee adopted the amendment, it “reemphasized its narrow coverage.”67 The committee directed that the
60. George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity
Employment Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 824–25 (1972) (noting that the original law
allowed the federal government very limited powers and as a result, “the reality for most aggrieved
individuals was a long round of negotiations with employers who, more often than not, were
undeterred by the threat of an individual suit and simply refused to comply”).
61. Id. at 847.
62. Id. at 847–48.
63. Id.
64. Id. Sape also noted that “studies seem to indicate that the employment practices of the states
are at least as discriminatory as those found in the private sector . . . . The intention of Congress in
expanding Title VII to include state and local governments was to provide an effective remedy
through federal action to governmental employees.” Id. at 848–49 (noting that it did not supplant
existing remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
65. Id. at 861.
66. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–(f) (2006).
67. Sape, supra note 60, at 861. Writing shortly after the amendment’s adoption four decades
ago, Sape also predicted: “Despite this language there undoubtedly will be extensive litigation
involving this issue, resulting from the infinite variety of state and local government hierarchies,
jobs and local personnel systems which will seek to maximize the exemption.” Id. at 862.
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exceptions applied narrowly and only to employees at the “highest
policymaking levels,” such as cabinet members.68
Two years after Congress added most local government workers to
the scope of Title VII, it similarly amended the ADEA.69 Because of the
amendment’s sparse legislative history and the fact that it was modeled
after Title VII, courts generally turn to Title VII’s legislative history
(described above) for interpretive guidance.70
As with the discrimination statutes, state and local governments were
initially exempted from the FLSA. Congress began narrowing that
exemption in 1966, when it extended minimum wage and overtime
standards to public hospitals, schools and certain mass-transit agencies.71
In 1974, Congress expanded the statute’s scope to include nearly all state
and local government employees.72 Today, the FLSA excludes elected
officials and their appointees in language nearly identical to that used in
the amended Title VII and the ADEA.73 The modern definition of
68. Id. at 862 (citing 118 CONG. REC. S3461 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. H1694
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972) (“This exemption is intended to be construed very narrowly and is in no
way intended to establish an overall narrowing of the expanded coverage of State and local
government employees.”)).
69. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 2747 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2006)).
70. See, e.g., Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 2000); Montgomery
v. Brookshire, 34 F.3d 291, 294–95 (5th Cir. 1994); Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir.
1992) (“The definition of ‘employee’ found in ADEA, however, was patterned after the virtually
identical provision contained in Title VII.”); EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990),
overruled in part by Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d
52, 55–56 (1st Cir. 1988). See generally Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L.
REV. 1093, 1099–101 (1993). Eglit discusses “instances of joint development [of the two statutes],
keyed to similar statutory language.” Id. at 1100. He refers to the statutes as “statutory cousin[s]”
that have undergone “joint evolution” and “tandem development.” Id. at 1097–103. Courts also turn
to Title VII’s history to evaluate the FLSA. Birch v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Prob. Ct., 392 F.3d 151, 161
(6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts have interpreted the FLSA’s ‘personal staff’ and “policymaking’
exemptions consistently with their Title VII counterparts.”). Finally, courts turn to Title VII to
construe the EPA. Spann-Wilder v. City of N. Charleston, C.A. No. 2:08-0156-MBS, 2010 WL
3222235, at *4 n.4 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Because of the identical language in Title VII and
EPA, these exceptions are interpreted in the same way under both statutes.”) (referencing Bland v.
New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“This exemption [under Title VII] is
identical to exemptions under the ADEA . . . the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . and Equal Pay Act
and a number of other statutes.”)).
71. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 1, 80 Stat. 830 (1966)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)). For more discussion, see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 533 (1985) (citing the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1966, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
72. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 § 6.
73. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(5), 86 Stat. 103
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)), excluded from Title VII and ADEA protections “any
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employee in the FLSA also applies to the FMLA because the FMLA
incorporates by reference the FLSA’s definition of “employee.”74
II.

CIRCUIT COURTS ARE WIDELY SPLIT OVER WHICH
EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM STATUTORY
WORKER PROTECTIONS

Circuit courts disagree over which types of employees fall within the
“policymaking-level” exception from federal employment protections.
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a sweeping construction, applying the
exclusion to workers who so much as suggest policies to the decisionmakers, or who exercise discretion in implementing others’ policies.75
By contrast, other circuits apply a far narrower definition, reserving the
exception for top public officials.76 The narrow approach is most
thoroughly developed by the Second Circuit, which has expressly
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s standard.77 The Second Circuit holds that
the policymaking-level exception applies only to appointees who “would
normally work closely with and be accountable to the [elected] official
who appointed them.”78

person elected to public office . . . or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s
personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to
the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office . . . [except] employees subject to the
civil service laws.” The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 § 6, excluded from FLSA
protections any individual who “(I) holds a public elective office . . . [or] (II) is selected by the
holder of the office to be a member of his personal staff [or] (III) is appointed by such an
officeholder to serve on the policymaking level, OR (IV) who is an immediate adviser to such an
officeholder with respect to the constitutional or legal powers of his office.”
74. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2006); see O’Reilly v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 102CV1242-DFH, 2003
WL 23101795, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2003).
75. See, e.g., Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991).
76. See infra Parts II.C., II.D.
77. Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 2000). For First Amendment
political patronage cases, that circuit uses a list of guiding factors to address the Elrod and Branti
tests. Id. at 744. “Our Title VII analysis, by contrast, draws on the language of the statute and
congressional intent.” Id. at 747.
78. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The Second Circuit later clarified that it read the U.S. Supreme
Court’s overruling of Vermont as applying only to the circumstance of that case. The circuit has
since said the underlying analysis remains valid, as does that circuit’s standard for determining
policymaking status. “Its reasoning was still sound.” Butler, 211 F.3d at 748; see also Tranello v.
Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a deputy county attorney was not exempted
from the ADEA: “We reaffirm our adherence to the sound conclusion reached on this issue in
Vermont, . . . ‘Congress meant to deny ADEA protection only to such appointees as would normally
work closely with and be accountable to the official who appointed them.’” (quoting Vermont, 904
F.2d at 800)).
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The U.S. Supreme Court Has Evaluated the Definition of
“Policymaking Level” in Establishing Separate “Political
Patronage” Rules

To interpret the policymaking-level exception within the employment
statutes, the Seventh Circuit imported U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
related to workers’ free speech rights. Under the First Amendment,
public employers may not hire or fire workers based on the employees’
political beliefs—a practice known as political patronage.79 However,
the Court long ago identified a need to balance workers’ constitutional
right of free speech against the pragmatic need to prevent obstructive
partisanship within government operations.80 Specifically, newly elected
officials could be hampered if forced to retain certain appointees with
opposing political views.
In Elrod v. Burns,81 employees of a county sheriff’s department
asserted they had been fired or threatened with termination because they
did not belong to the same political party as the sheriff.82 The workers
claimed the dismissals violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.83 A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed—to a point.84 The
plurality held patronage dismissals unconstitutional when applied to
employees who are not policymakers.85 Thus, the Elrod plurality held
that politicians enjoyed a limited right to install like-minded and
“political[ly] loyal[]” “policymaking” officials who would not
undermine the agenda of a newly elected administration, which was
“presumably sanctioned by the electorate.”86 In other words, if voters
replace an official with someone from a different political party, the
newly elected official should not be forced to retain a potentially
obstructionist second-in-command whose loyalty remains with the
former boss. The Elrod Court provided no bright-line rules for
determining policymaking-level status. Instead, it explained that courts
79. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976).
80. Id. at 367.
81. Id. at 347.
82. Id. at 349–51.
83. Id. at 350. The U.S. Supreme Court explained patronage thusly in Elrod: “Under that practice,
public employees hold their jobs on the condition that they provide, in some acceptable manner,
support for the favored political party. The threat of dismissal for failure to provide that support
unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association . . . .” Id. at 359.
84. Id. at 360 (“[T]he prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment protections [by political
patronage] is not absolute. Restraints are permitted for appropriate reasons.”).
85. Id. at 372–73.
86. Id. at 367.
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should determine policymaker status based on “whether the employee
acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the implementation of broad
goals.”87
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court modified its exclusion from
the political patronage rule. In Branti v. Finkel,88 the Court signaled that
“policymaking” was not a litmus-test trait; rather, it is sometimes proper
for politics to drive the hiring or termination decisions of subordinates
“who are neither confidential nor policymaking in character.”89 The
Branti court clarified that it intended the doctrine to allow employers
greater discretion “if an employee’s private political beliefs would
interfere with the discharge of his public duties.”90 The Seventh Circuit
has held the Court’s rules allowing for limited political discrimination
should also apply in statutory worker rights claims.
B.

The Seventh Circuit Applies the Elrod/Branti Standard to Define
the “Policymaking-Level” Exception in Federal Employment
Statutes

The Seventh Circuit adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s political
patronage analyses in Elrod and Branti to define the reach of Title VII
and other employment discrimination statutes.91 First, while deciding a
patronage case in 1981, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Elrod and Branti
to direct that politically motivated hiring and termination are lawful
when “the position held by the individual authorizes, either directly or
indirectly, meaningful input into governmental decisionmaking on issues
where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their
implementation.”92 Then, in 1993, the Seventh Circuit announced that

87. Id. at 368.
88. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
89. Id. at 518 (citing, as an example, hiring election precinct supervisors from certain political
parties when election laws require representation of different political parties). Furthermore, “the
ultimate inquiry is not whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position;
rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Id. Applied to
the instant case: “[W]hatever policymaking occurs in the public defender’s office must relate to the
needs of individual clients and not to any partisan political interests.” Id. at 519. While endorsing a
potentially broader exception from political patronage law, the Branti Court ruled for the plaintiffs
in the instant case; the Court held that two assistant county public defenders were not policymakers
and therefore it would be unconstitutional to fire them based on their political views. Id. at 519–20.
90. Id. at 517 (explaining that in such cases, a worker’s “First Amendment rights may be required
to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency”).
91. Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1993).
92. Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981).
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the same rule applied to federal employment statutes, starting with the
ADEA.93 In affirming the dismissal of an age discrimination claim by a
former city health inspector, the court said: “[t]he reasons for exempting
the office from the patronage ban apply with equal force to the
requirements of the ADEA.”94 The Circuit has reaffirmed this standard
in more than one dozen cases.95
The Seventh Circuit has rejected a bright line between policymaking
and policy implementation.96 Indeed, the court applied the
policymaking-level exception to an appointee who claimed he was
expressly disallowed from making policy, deeming him at the
policymaking level because he might advise the actual policymakers.97
The Circuit has explained that actual authority is not required to qualify
for policymaking-level status if the employee in question enjoys
sufficient access to the decision-maker, i.e., if he or she offers input, yet
without control.98 Similarly, sheriff’s deputies fall within the Seventh
Circuit’s exception because they exercise discretion while on patrol.99
93. Heck, 985 F.2d at 310. In Heck, the plaintiff alleged both political and age discrimination
claims. The Seventh Circuit first considered the political patronage question. Id. at 308. The court
held that the plaintiff was a policymaker under Elrod and Branti, which, in the Seventh Circuit, is
based on whether the position “authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into
government decisionmaking.” Id. at 309 (citations omitted) (quoting Tomczak v. City of Chicago,
765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1985)). Thus, the court held, the plaintiff did not qualify for First
Amendment protection. Id. at 310. The court later moved to the question of the ADEA and simply
upheld a lower court holding—without providing analysis of the ADEA’s language or history—that
the Elrod/Branti standard applies. Id. Three years later, the Seventh Circuit ratified that standard
and endorsed its use in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 144 (7th Cir.
1996) (again omitting discussion of the statute’s plain text or legislative history).
94. Heck, 985 F.2d at 310.
95. See, e.g., Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a case brought by a
former city zoning board chairman); Americanos, 74 F.3d 138 (dismissing a case brought by a
former deputy state attorney general).
96. Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The appellants
contend that Assistant State’s Attorneys merely implement policy actions on behalf of the State’s
Attorney. We disagree. An Assistant State’s Attorney carries out policy on behalf of the
government, and in doing so has ‘meaningful input into governmental decision-making . . . .’”).
97. See Americanos, 74 F.3d 138. The Americanos court acknowledged plaintiff’s contention that
he “‘was required to refer all issues and questions involving politics and policy making to the Chief
Counsel,’ [who would] make the ultimate decision on how to implement the AG’s goals.” Id. at
142. And yet the court deemed the employee to be on the policymaking level because “it is likely
that in making such referrals Americanos was asked to advise his superiors concerning what his
research into these issues revealed, and what he thought would be the correct course of legal
action.” Id. (emphasis added).
98. Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1995).
99. Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[D]eputies on patrol or other
assignment frequently work autonomously, giving them wide latitude and discretion in the
performance of their duties and in the implementation of department goals.”).
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The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of “policymaking level” also
includes, for instance, research analysts who provide information that
might influence actual decisionmakers.100
The Seventh Circuit recently applied the “policymaking” label to
another broad job title: state assistant attorneys general. In Opp v. Office
of State’s Attorney of Cook County,101 three former assistant state’s
attorneys alleged that age discrimination motivated their 2007
terminations, in violation of the ADEA.102 A federal district court
dismissed their claims on the ground that they are not covered by the
ADEA.103 The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision, holding as a matter
of law that the state’s nine hundred assistant attorneys general qualify as
“policymakers.”104
In Opp, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the plaintiffs’ request
that the court abandon its unique test and develop a standard for the
policymaking-level exception that squares with other circuits.105 Instead,
the court stood by its practice of effectively equating policy
implementation with policymaking:
The appellants contend that Assistant State’s Attorneys merely
implement policy actions on behalf of the State’s Attorney. We
disagree. An Assistant State’s Attorney carries out policy on
behalf of the government, and in doing so has “meaningful input
into governmental decision-making on issues where there is
room for principled disagreement on goals or their
implementation.”106
In other words, it held, simply “carry[ing] out” policy directives “on
behalf” of the officials who hold actual authority to set such policies
amounts to serving at the policymaking level.107
C.

The Second Circuit Uses Legislative Language and Intent to
Construe the Scope of the “Policymaking Level”
The Second Circuit first construed the policymaking-level exception

100. Bonds v. Milwaukee Cnty., 207 F.3d 969, 977 (7th Cir. 2000).
101. Opp, 630 F.3d at 616.
102. Id. at 618–19.
103. Opp v. Office of State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 660 F. Supp. 2d 932 (2009).
104. Opp, 630 F.3d at 620–21.
105. Id. at 620 (“We choose . . . not to draw a distinction between how aggrieved individuals are
interpreted as policymakers under the First Amendment and under the ADEA.”).
106. Id. at 621.
107. Id.
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in 1990 in EEOC v. Vermont. 108 There, the court turned to traditional
canons of statutory construction to determine the breadth of the
policymaking-level exception.109 First, the court examined the ADEA’s
definition of “employee.”110 The statute lists “policymaking level” as the
second of three categories exempted from that definition.111 The
Vermont court noted that the first and third classes—“personal staff” and
“immediate adviser(s)”112—are narrow, “suggest[ing] that Congress
intended [a] more limited interpretation” of the exempted categories.113
The court found that these categories “plainly” refer only to employees
who “work closely” with officials.114 The court then inferred that
Congress intended the policymaking-level category to generally align in
scope with those more limited categories:115 Had Congress intended the
policymaker category to be read more broadly than the other categories,
it likely would have put that class at the end of the list.116
The Vermont court next considered the legislative history of Title
VII.117 Congress created exceptions for policymaking-level appointees
and others in the 1972 Title VII amendments that expanded the law to
government employees.118 Lawmakers similarly amended the ADEA
two years later.119 Discussing an earlier version of the amendment
(which did not yet include the “policymaking-level” exception), the
bill’s manager120 told his colleagues: “[t]he purpose of the
108. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
109. See id. at 798 (“The contents and structure of the exception suggest that Congress intended
the more limited interpretation.”).
110. Id.
111. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2006).
112. Id.
113. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (“[W]e would infer that the middle category was intended to share basic characteristics of
the categories that surrounded it.”)
117. Id. (“Though there is scant legislative history with respect to the definition of ‘employee’ in
the ADEA, we are aided by the fact that the ADEA was patterned after Title VII . . . .”); see also
Sape, supra note 60.
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. See supra Part I.A.
120. During congressional floor debates, “the bill manager for the majority party controls the
time devoted to debate and to particular amendments, determining which members speak and for
how long.” Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Meanings: Deriving
Interpretive Principles from a Theory of Communication and Lawmaking, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 979,
988 (2011).
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amendment . . . [is] to exempt from coverage those who are chosen by
the . . . elected official . . . and who are in a close personal relationship
and an immediate relationship with him. Those who are his first line of
advisers.”121 Lawmakers later added the exemption for appointees at the
policymaking level. They issued a statement explaining that their
intention was to exempt “persons . . . at the highest levels of the
departments or agencies . . . such as cabinet officers, and persons with
comparable responsibilities . . . . It is (our) intent that this exemption
shall be construed narrowly.”122 From that legislative history, the
Vermont court concluded: “Congress meant to deny ADEA protection
only to such appointees as would normally work closely with and be
accountable to the official who appointed them.”123
The U.S. Supreme Court effectively overruled the Second Circuit’s
Vermont holding that state judges were not policymakers.124 However,
the Second Circuit has since stood by its underlying reasoning in
Vermont that the exception was to be narrowly construed and applied
only to “such appointees as would normally work closely with and be
accountable to the official who appointed them.”125 Most recently, in
Butler v. New York State Department of Law,126 the Second Circuit
reaffirmed its rule that courts should narrowly construe127 the
policymaking exception to apply only to appointees holding
“policymaking positions at the highest levels”128 of government agencies
who “would normally work closely with and be accountable to the
official who appointed them.”129
D.

Other Circuits Support the Second Circuit’s General Approach
Several other circuits have adopted standards for interpreting the

121. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 799 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (emphasis in original) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 4492–93 (1972)).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 43 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2180, 1971 WL
11301 (emphasis added).
123. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800.
124. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The Second Circuit acknowledged that Gregory
overruled its specific holding in Vermont that an appointed state judge was not an appointee on the
policymaking level. Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1992).
125. See Tranello, 962 F.2d at 250.
126. 211 F.3d 739 (2d Cir. 2000).
127. Id. at 749.
128. Id. at 747 (quoting Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800).
129. Id. at 748 (“The resolution of the issue turns on whether it was part of the job of a Deputy
Bureau Chief to work closely with the AG.”).
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scope of the “policymaking-level” exception similar to that of the
Second Circuit.130 The First Circuit has agreed that Title VII’s legislative
history indicates that Congress intended its exceptions to be narrowly
construed to apply only to “top decisionmakers.”131 Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit held that the Civil Rights Act’s legislative history reflects
Congress’s intent to create a “narrow exemption” for appointed
employees in a “close, personal . . . and . . . immediate relationship” with
their appointer.132 Accordingly, the court held that a city staff director
did not serve at the policymaking level, in part because “the staff
director has occasionally advised the mayor on his constitutional and
legal powers . . . . Direct interaction between the mayor and the staff
director is minimal.”133
The Eighth Circuit has also examined policymaking-level status
according to the appointee’s authority and related factors.134 Without
relying heavily on the legislative history of Title VII,135 the Eighth
Circuit reached a conclusion similar to that of the Second Circuit:
Congress’s exemption of appointees on the policymaking level
“manifests an interest in excluding persons entrusted with extensive
decisionmaking authority and discretionary power. . . .”136 In an earlier
130. The Fifth Circuit has not extensively evaluated the meaning of “policymaking level.”
However, it has generally endorsed a narrow construction of the exceptions. See, e.g., Rutland v.
Moore, 54 F.3d 226, 230 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Congressional conference committee statement
that the exception was intended to apply “at the highest levels . . . such as cabinet officers”);
Teneyuca v. Bexar Cnty., 767 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1985) (in evaluating the related but separate
“personal staff” exception, directing: “This Court’s consideration of these factors must be tempered
by the legislative history of this provision which indicates that the exception is to be narrowly
construed”).
131. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding judges at the policymaking
level for the purposes of the ADEA).
132. Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 474 F.3d 747, 752 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding
Congress intended the exception would apply to appointees with an “intimate and sensitive
association” with the elected official (quoting Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 801
(10th Cir. 1982)).
133. Anderson, 690 F.2d at 801.
134. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 603–04 (8th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 452
(1991); Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 278–79 (8th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
135. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 602 (noting about the legislative history: “we are not inclined to assign
[it] a great deal of weight, since the only reliable guide to legislative intent is the language and
structure of the statute itself”).
136. Id. at 603. Gregory held that judges serve on the policymaking level because at least some of
their decisions “will resolve issues previously unsettled and thus will create law . . . . [J]udges must
exercise the same sort of discretion in decisionmaking, temper their rulings with the same sort of
self-restraint, and engage in the same sort of thoughtful judgment that is required of ‘appointee[s]
on the policymaking level’ in the executive and legislative branches.” Id. at 601–02.
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case deciding an ADEA claim by a former state arts council director,137
the Eighth Circuit spelled out several factors for evaluating whether the
plaintiff was appointed at the policymaking level: (1) “whether the
[appointee] has discretionary, rather than solely administrative powers,”
(2) “whether the [appointee] serves at the pleasure of the appointing
authority”; and (3) whether the appointee “formulates policy.”138 Thus,
the Eighth Circuit generally accords with the First, Second, and Tenth
Circuits in narrowly defining the scope of the policymaking-level
exception within the context of worker right statutes. These Circuits
have parted ways with the Seventh Circuit, which has adopted a
relatively expansive interpretation of the policymaking exception based
on analogy to political discrimination in employment law.
III. CONGRESS OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD LIMIT
THE POLICYMAKING EXCEPTION TO APPOINTEES WHO
DIRECTLY FORMULATE SUBSTANTIVE POLICY
Although Congress neglected to define “policymaking level” for the
purposes of worker protection statutes, lawmakers did provide ample
explicit and implicit guidance. The plain language of the statutes in
question, their legislative history, and their context within broader social
policy goals illuminate the shortcomings of the analyses by both camps
in the circuit split. The Seventh Circuit makes two errors: (1) it
improperly borrows a standard from the separate political discrimination
doctrine, neglecting to follow fundamental canons of statutory
construction; and (2) it misconstrues the Elrod/Branti doctrine that it
imports from political patronage jurisprudence. The Second Circuit and
others take a better approach, which honors the employment statutes’
language according to traditional canons of construction. However, that
approach lacks sufficient lucidity and specificity. To correct these
inadequacies and inconsistencies, either Congress or the U.S. Supreme
Court should articulate a clear standard defining policymaking-level
employees as top-level officials with working relationships with their
appointees who are charged with substantive policy development.

137. Stillians, 843 F.2d 276.
138. Id. at 278–79 (emphasis added). Two years later, the Eighth Circuit clarified that the factors
were not intended to be an all-purpose test: the list is not “intended to be exhaustive or necessarily
applicable in all respects to every kind of appointed official.” Gregory, 898 F.2d at 604.
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The Plain Language of the Statutes Supports a Narrow
Construction of the Policymaking Exception

Statutory construction begins “with the text of the statute.” 139 Where
a word or phrase is ambiguous, context clarifies.140 As Judge Learned
Hand explained, statutory interpretation requires a holistic approach
because words and phrases share a “communal existence” where
individual segments inform neighboring words and “not only does the
meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take
their purport from the setting in which they are used.”141 Under the
canon of construction noscitur a sociis, “an ambiguous term may be
given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is
associated.”142 When a statute includes enumerated terms, any relatively
general terms accompanied by narrower counterparts should be narrowly
construed under the “venerable principle of ejusdem generis” which
“counsels us to construe the broad in light of the narrow.”143
Here, Congress included the “policymaking level” as the second of
three enumerated categories of exempted employees: “personal staff,”
“employees on the policymaking level,” and “immediate advisers.”144 As
the Second Circuit explained,145 courts should construe the policymaking
category within its statutory context—or in Judge Hand’s words, its
“communal existence.”146 Also, under the canon of noscitur a sociis,
which directs consideration of surrounding language when interpreting a
specific term, the middle (“policymaking”) term should be construed to
share the same narrow character as the first and third categories. Finally,
the “policymaking-level” exception should not be read to refer to policy
advisers since that would improperly render the two categories
redundant.147
Rather than studying the statutes in question, the Seventh Circuit
turned for direction by analogy to the U.S. Supreme Court’s political
139. Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197 (2007).
140. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
141. Id.
142. United States v. Stevens, __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
143. United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001).
144. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006).
145. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990).
146. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
147. See 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 21:1 (7th ed. 2008).
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discrimination case law.148 The Seventh Circuit skipped over traditional
analysis of the statutes’ language and Congress’s intent, 149 and instead
applied the Elrod/Branti to statutory discrimination cases.150 While
courts may sometimes properly construe statutes by analogy to other
laws, even unrelated laws,151 the statutory language here is readily
interpreted and does not require such a stretch.
Moreover, neither Elrod nor Branti support the approach adopted by
the Seventh Circuit. Rather, Elrod suggested a narrow scope in its
exception from the general prohibition against political patronage: “In
determining whether an employee occupies a policymaking position,
consideration should . . . be given to whether the employee acts as an
adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals.”152
Elrod and Branti were intended only to facilitate the democratic process
by allowing newly elected officials to replace politically hostile
incumbent officers at the top levels of government.153 In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit recasts the patronage standards to exempt a wide swath
of workers from basic employment laws.154 The disconnect is manifest:
148. Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 311 (7th Cir. 1993).
149. In 1993, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff was exempt from patronage protection
because he was a policymaker under Elrod and Branti. Heck, 985 F.2d at 310. The court then held
the same plaintiff exempt from ADEA protection for the same reason, without providing analysis of
the ADEA’s language or history. Id. at 310. The Second Circuit explained: “The Seventh Circuit
has used a single test to resolve the policymaker question under both the First Amendment and the
employment discrimination statutes . . . . Our Title VII analysis, by contrast, draws on the language
of the statute and congressional intent.” Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746–47
(2d Cir. 2000); see also supra text accompanying note 92.
150. See, e.g., Heck, 985 F.2d at 310 (“The reasons for exempting the office from the patronage
ban apply with equal force to the requirements of the ADEA.”).
151. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, § 53:2. However, the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of
the standard from the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Amendment political patronage jurisprudence
should not be evaluated under the canon of in pari materia. In pari materia is a canon of
construction directing that matters that are of the “same subject” or “relating to the same matter”
may be construed together. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004). The borrowed
patronage standard used here is extrinsic to the employment rights statues at issue and does not
“pertain to the same particular subject with sufficient focus to make it reasonable to suppose that
legislators and persons affected by one statute would also be affected by another. . . . Where the
relationship between the statutes is not that specific . . . the interpretive relevance of other statutes is
found, if at all, in the evidence they may supply that certain modes of legislative action are
sufficiently conventional or standardized in the legal system to influence the thinking of legislators
and others who contemplate the meaning of a particular statute in the system.” 2B SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 151, § 53:2 (citations omitted).
152. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976) (emphasis added).
153. See supra Part II.A.1.
154. See, e.g., Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding as
a matter of law that hundreds of assistant state attorneys general are appointed on the policymaking
level).
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the Elrod plurality declined to deem a chief deputy sheriff a policymaker
in a political discrimination claim.155 Yet the Seventh Circuit has twice
applied Elrod to reach the opposite conclusion in political patronage
cases: holding as a matter of law that deputy sheriffs were policymakers
and thus unprotected.156 The Circuit’s reasoning that patronage caselaw
directs its statutory construction is especially awkward given the U.S.
Supreme Court’s direction against reliance on a strict “policymaking”
label in patronage cases. The Court clarified in Branti that its patronage
exception was not to be applied according to a mechanical
“policymaking-level” test; rather, the proper inquiry was whether
partisan allegiance was an “appropriate requirement” for the position in
question.157 Notably, Branti dissenters lamented their prediction that the
majority’s holding would mean that assistant government attorneys
would not be exempt from the patronage ban.158 Yet the Seventh Circuit
recently relied on its reading of Elrod and Branti to justify deeming all
Illinois assistant attorneys general as policymaking-level appointees, and
therefore excluded from workers’ rights protections.159 Courts in that
circuit have repeatedly defined state attorneys and prosecutors as
policymaking-level appointees as a matter of law.160
The misconstruction of the standard has not gone unnoticed. As the
Eleventh Circuit said, “Application of the Seventh Circuit’s broad test
has led to results far afield from Branti.”161 For example, in Americanos
155. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367–74 (creating policymaking exception to bar on patronage, but
declining to apply that exception to respondents in the instant case, including a chief deputy sheriff).
Also, the dissent commented on the narrow scope of the exception. Id. at 386–87 n.10 (Burger, J.,
dissenting) (“The judgment today is limited to nonpolicymaking positions . . . [I]t is doubtful that
any significant number of employees can be identified as policymakers in a sheriff’s office. States
have chosen to provide for the election of many local officials who have little or no genuine
policymaking functions . . . and the subordinates of such officials are even less likely to have such
functions. It thus is predictable that the holding today will terminate almost completely the
contributions of patronage hiring practices to the democratic process.”).
156. Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1993); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209,
1218 (7th Cir. 1991).
157. Branti v. Finkel 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label
‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved.”).
158. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be difficult to say, under the
Court’s standard, that ‘partisan’ concerns properly are relevant to the performance of the duties of a
United States attorney.”).
159. Opp, 630 F.3d at 622.
160. See, e.g., Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1996); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d
798, 800 (7th Cir. 1983).
161. Cutcliffe v. Cochran, 117 F.3d 1353, 1357 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997).
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v. Carter,162 the Seventh Circuit withheld age discrimination protection
from a deputy Indiana state attorney general (“DAG”) based on its
holding that he was categorically disqualified from patronage protection
by Elrod and Branti. The court wrote: “if some DAGs can be terminated
based on their political affiliation, all can be.”163 However, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that, “Americanos appears to lie in sharp contrast to
the facts of Branti itself, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
assistant public defenders were protected from patronage dismissal.”164
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit is resolute in its reliance on patronage
case law to interpret worker-rights statutes, its skewed application of the
patronage standards garners different results than did the Court in the
underlying cases.
B.

Congress Intended a Limited Scope for the Policymaking-Level
Exception to These Remedial Measures

Beyond the statutes’ text, legislative history reveals Congress’s intent
to create a narrow exception for employees at the “policymaking level.”
When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is proper to turn to the
statute’s legislative history for guidance as to Congress’s intent.165
Moreover, if an alternative interpretation clashes with legislative intent
as reflected in legislative history, courts should adhere to the nonconflicting interpretation.166 Among legislative history documents, a
congressional conference report is “recognized as the most reliable
evidence of congressional intent . . . .”167
Congress unequivocally indicated its intent was for only narrow
exceptions to the statutes. A congressional leader told his colleagues
during the development of the exceptions that the purpose was to
exclude only “first line advisers” who are “in a close personal . . . [and]
immediate relationship” with their appointers.168 Also, a congressional
conference committee report explained: “This exemption is intended to
162. Americanos, 74 F.3d at 138.
163. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
164. Cutcliffe, 74 F.3d at 1357 n.4 (emphasis added).
165. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 475 (D. Kan. 1996). The Seventh
Circuit relied on legislative history and Congressional intent in construing a statute in Graczyk v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 763 F.2d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1985).
166. Marcor Dev. Corp. v. United States, 20 Ct. Int’l Trade 538, 543 (1996) (citing Kyocera Int’l,
Inc. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int’l Trade 91, 96 (1981), aff’d, United States v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 681
F.2d 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
167. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1996).
168. 118 CONG. REC. 4492–93 (1972).
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be construed very narrowly and is in no way intended to establish an
overall narrowing of the expanded coverage of State and local
government employees.”169 Ultimately, Congress issued a report
explaining that it wanted the exceptions “construed narrowly” and
applied only to cabinet members and such officials at the “highest
levels” of government.170
Also, like all civil rights statutes, anti-discrimination statutes warrant
broad application and only narrow exclusions.171 Courts generally
construe civil rights laws broadly in light of their remedial purpose.172
To interpret the “policymaking-level” exception to deny protections to
workers who enjoy no genuine policy authority dilutes the statutes’
significance. The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation abandons broad
classes of public workers, undermining Congress’s express intent. As
one scholar observed when Congress expanded federal worker
protections forty years ago: “it was the clear intention of Congress in
enacting the 1972 amendments that the scope and effect of Title VII
should be broadly construed to eliminate employment discrimination.”173
A federal judge in Oregon said shortly after Congress amended Title VII
that Congress intended exceptions only for those in “sensitive” or
“intimate positions,” not, for example, for “large groups of faceless
technicians and researchers.”174 A broad construction defeats Congress’s
policy goal in expanding Title VII and the other statutes to exclude a

169. 118 CONG. REC. 7166–67 (1972).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2180, 1971 WL 11301.
171. The U.S. Supreme Court has directed that statutory policy objectives should guide statutory
construction. See Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“It is the duty of this
court to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355 (1856).
172. 3B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, § 76:6 (“Courts and commentators now generally
agree . . . that civil rights acts are remedial and should be liberally construed so their beneficent
objectives may be realized to the fullest extent possible. To this end, courts apply a broad and
inclusive understanding of the language in legislation and initiatives to protect and implement civil
rights . . . . Correlatively, courts strictly construe exceptions and limitations which restrict the
operation of such laws.”); see also Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic
Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1984) (“Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibits employment discrimination in the broadest possible terms . . . . Thus, courts have liberally
interpreted the substantive and procedural provisions of Title VII to ensure the achievement of these
goals.” (citations omitted)).
173. Sape, supra note 60, at 857. Note also, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that rules
exempting some employers from the FLSA, “are to be narrowly construed against the employers
seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and
unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392
(1960) (citations omitted).
174. Gearhart v. Oregon, 410 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D. Or. 1976).
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relatively small number of workers,175 not sweeping categories of public
servants.
C.

Any Remaining Ambiguity Is Resolved Under Proper Deference to
the Narrow Construction Adopted by the EEOC

The EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing statutes outlawing
employment discrimination, has construed the “policymaking” exception
in narrow terms. The U.S. Supreme Court directs courts to defer to that
agency when evaluating Title VII, holding that “administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great
deference.”176 The EEOC has unambiguously explained that Congress
intended the “policymaking-level” exceptions to apply to individuals
who lead agencies and who “work closely with elected officials and their
advisors in developing policies that will implement the overall goals of
the elected officials.”177 Also, the EEOC has explained that Congress
intended the exceptions to allow elected officials “complete freedom” in
appointing agency directors to work with them to “develop[ ] policies
that will implement the overall goals of the elected officials.”178 The
Seventh Circuit’s rule flatly contradicts this guidance from the EEOC,
contrary to the Court’s rule of agency deference.
D.

The Court or Congress Should Clarify that the Policymaking-Level
Exception Applies Only to Top-Ranking Policy Players

Either the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress must resolve the discord
over the scope of the policymaking-level exception with a standard that
honors the language of the workers’ rights laws and reflects Congress’s
intent that the exception apply to a narrow set of high-ranking public

175. Sape, supra note 60, at 847–48.
176. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971).
177. EEOC Decision No. 78-42, Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 6725 (Sept. 29, 1978) (emphasis in
original); see also EEOC Decision No. 78-33, Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 6718 (June 1, 1978) (“The
legislative history amply documents the intent of Congress that the exceptions to 701(f) are to be
construed narrowly.”).
178. EEOC Decision No. 78-42, at *1 (“In exempting policymaking appointees, Congress
realized the necessity of allowing elected officials complete freedom in appointing those who would
direct state and local departments and agencies. These individuals must work closely with elected
officials and their advisors in developing policies that will implement the overall goals of the
elected officials. In order to achieve these goals, an elected official is likely to prefer individuals
with similar political and ideological outlooks. Congress intended to allow elected officials the
freedom to appoint those with whom they feel they can work best.”).
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officials (for example, cabinet-level positions).179
Neither of the circuits that have the most thoroughly-developed
jurisprudence on the policymaking-level exception offers an appropriate,
definitive standard. The Seventh Circuit’s broad reading of the
policymaking exception—labeling as policymakers public employees
with basic discretion or the ability to offer input—contradicts the
statutes’ language and Congress’s express intent. It is also at odds with
the very case law it imports. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit’s (rightly)
narrower approach is insufficient and vague. That Circuit’s standard—
exempting only employees who “normally would work closely with and
be accountable to”180 their appointers—is potentially helpful as a
guideline but falls short of a sufficiently definitive test. Congress was
clear that its exceptions to the definition of employee in the workers’
rights statutes were to be read narrowly and applied only to top-ranking
employees, such as cabinet members.181 The Second Circuit recognizes
this limited scope, but lacks a lucid, relevant definition of policymakinglevel exception. Either the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress should
adopt the following three-part framework for evaluating whether an
appointee falls within the exception to the civil rights laws: (1) does the
appointee have a sufficiently direct relationship with the appointer?; (2)
does the appointee establish policy, as opposed to merely advising or
implementing policy?; and (3) does the appointee’s authority reach to
substantive policy, beyond procedural or administrative discretion?
1.

To Qualify as a Policymaking-Level Employee Under These
Statutes, the Appointee Must Have a Direct Relationship with the
Appointer

As the statutory language and legislative history reflect, lawmakers
intended the exception to apply to elected officials’ closest confidants,
not, for example, to middle managers who set administrative policies on
bureaucratic matters.182 Therefore, the law should limit the
policymaking-level exception to appointees holding positions
characterized by a direct and meaningful relationship with the official
who appointed them. The Second Circuit rightly evaluated the standard

179. See supra Part III.B.2.
180. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
181. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, supra note 170; see also Sape, supra note 60, at 862 (citing 118
CONG. REC. S3461 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. H1694 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972)).
182. See supra Part. III.B.2.
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as one of access and accountability to the official.183 Such a position
would likely be directly supervised by the appointer, but the language
and history of the statutory definition do not require such a relationship,
as was implied by the Second Circuit.184 Still, to qualify as
policymaking-level, the appointee’s position must carry intimacy with
the appointer on par with those of “immediate advisers” and “personal
staff” members.185
2.

The Policymaking-Level Exception Should Apply Only to Positions
that Involve Policy Formulation as a Fundamental Duty

Before an appointee may be excluded from protections under this
exemption, an employer should be required to show that the worker held
the authority and the duty to set policy. This evaluation should rely on
the inherent characteristics of the job as defined, not necessarily as
performed by an individual plaintiff.186 The employee must hold power
to make policy, subject only to the approval of the appointer. The
purpose of the exception was to exclude only those empowered to enact
(or obstruct) the politicians’ substantive agenda. For these purposes, an
appointee would not qualify as serving on the policymaking level if he
or she advised on policy matters;187 nor if he or she implemented or
executed policy. Finally, to serve on the policymaking level,
policymaking must be an essential attribute of the position.
3.

The Policymaking-Level Exception Should Only Apply to Positions
Influencing Substantive Policy and Should Not Trickle down to
Administrators or Bureaucrats with Day-to-Day Discretion

The Seventh Circuit has deemed a sweeping range of public
employees as policymaking-level appointees—from sheriff deputies188
to assistant public attorneys189—simply because they enjoy discretion in
day-to-day dealings. But Congress clearly intended a higher bar for the
“policy” referred to in the “policymaking-level” exemption. The
183. Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 2000).
184. See, e.g., Butler, 211 F.3d at 744.
185. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798.
186. Cf. Butler, 211 F.3d at 749 (applying the exception to employees whose job descriptions
carry certain attributes, rather than evaluating based on actual job performance).
187. Such an appointee might qualify under the separate “immediate adviser” exception.
188. Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1993); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209,
1218 (7th Cir. 1991).
189. Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2010).
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exception should be limited to employees who create policies that are
substantive in nature, rather than merely procedural or administrative.
Exempting those in the latter categories betrays the goal of the
policymaking exemption because it would exclude administrators as
well as policymakers. Adopting a narrower interpretation of the
exemption also ensures appointees are not denied protections based on
ad hoc or informal advising or because of defendants’ disingenuous
assertions of the appointee’s authority.
The U.S. Supreme Court or Congress should follow the lead of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which spelled out what constitutes
“policymaking” and “policy.”190 In a 1989 age discrimination case, the
Pennsylvania court noted that the ADEA did not define “policymaking.”
The court turned to a Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary for
guidance:
“Policymaking” may be defined as the act of elaborating
policy . . . and “policy” is defined as “a definite course or
method of action selected from among alternatives . . . to guide
and determine present and future decisions” or “a high-level
overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable
procedures especially of a governmental body.”191
Black’s Law Dictionary offers a similar take; it defines “policy” as: “The
general principles by which a government is guided in its management
of public affairs.”192 To foster consistency, federal law should similarly
define policy and policymaking for the purposes of this exemption. To
honor Congress’s intent, that definition should clarify that the exception
applies only to meaningful policy development, not bureaucratic
discretion.
CONCLUSION
Courts’ inconsistent interpretations of the “policymaking-level”
exception implicate workers’ rights under several socially ambitious and
important laws. These laws were intended to establish fundamental civil
rights, to be denied only under the narrowest of conditions. The statutory
language related to the policymaking-level exception, the statutes’
legislative history, and the interpretation by the EEOC all indicate that
the exception should be limited in scope. Moreover, there is no policy
justification for allowing elected officials broad discretion to
190. In re Stout, 559 A.2d 489, 495–96 (Pa. 1989).
191. Id.
192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).
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discriminate based on race, sex, religion, age, or caregiver status. No
greater good is served if politicians are given wide room to circumvent
wage and workplace standards laws.
Yet confusion and inconsistency have plagued courts dealing with
public workers’ attempts to assert their rights. These circumstances
demand a clear framework. To prevent further disharmony with
Congressional intent, Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court must clarify
the law to narrowly define the scope of the policymaking exception. If
we allow officials greater discretion by denying public employees the
protection of federal civil rights laws, it must be applied only to those
whom Congress intended. Accordingly, the exception must be limited to
appointees making substantive policy with meaningful authority and
legitimately close relationships with their bosses.

